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ABSTRACT  The resource agitations and conflicts in the oil rich Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria that were originally civil and communal have since been transformed into armed 
struggles conducted by disparate youth militia groups. Crime, violence and insecurity, state 
militarization, ethnic militia-ization and communal and ethnic wars now pervade the re-
gion. The study analyzed the youth militancy and militias in the context of deep economic 
and resource crises and found that multinational oil company strategies and state repression 
conduced the emergence and consolidation of the militia phenomenon from the youth who 
are plagued by unemployment and poverty. The study also found that infiltration of political 
elites, loss of focus and poor control have combined to turn the militias into perpetrators of 
crime, violence and insecurity and agents of private interests and greed. The consequences of 
militancy and militia-ization have been very disruptive and devastative to the economy, gov-
ernance, inter-group relations, communal cohesion and security of the Niger Delta region. 
Key Words: Oil; Conflict; Youth; Militias; Nigeria.
INTRODUCTION
The resource agitation of the Niger Delta has since 1997 acquired a very 
militant and violent dimension. What began as community agitation has 
undoubtedly undergone several transformations. The first profound transforma-
tion was the flowering of civil society which mobilized a popular civil strug-
gle. In the second, the transformation was extended from that against the 
multinational oil companies (MNCs) to include the Nigerian state. The third 
transformation was the elevation of the agitation from pure developmental 
issues to include the political demands such as federal restructuring, resource 
control and the resolution of the national question through a conference of 
ethnic nationalities. 
A second dimension saw the entrance of youths, youth militancy and youth 
militias with volatile demands and ultimate that elevated the scale of confronta-
tions and violence with the MNCs and the state. More recently, youth activism 
and militancy has become associated with a dangerous tide of abductions of 
expatriate and indigenous staff, hostage and ransom taking and economic crimes 
such as sea piracy, pipeline vandalization and oil pilferage. There is a large 
scale proliferation of arms among youths, youth groups and militias. 
In the current and fourth stage of the transformation, the struggle has turned 
88 A. IKELEGBE
the region into an arena, first of economic crimes, violence, wars between eth-
nic and communal groups and the general criminalization of social life. Sec-
ond, the region has been turned into a battle zone between militias and the 
Nigerian state. The situation is such that recent policy has been the massive 
deployment of the Nigerian Army and Navy to create an enabling environment 
for oil exploitation and to restore confidence of oil operators (Adebayo, 2003). 
The Niger Delta today is in a state of generalized insecurity which has to some 
extent, undermined the economy of the production of crude oil, the revenues 
and profits accruable to both the state, oil producing and servicing companies, 
local and communal governance and the security of lives and property. Some 
youths engage in self-interest and factional fighting, attracting criminals from 
the region and otherwise to cash in on the agitation and insecurity to perpetuate 
economic crimes. Already the waterways, creeks and rivers have become unsafe. 
The situation of kidnappings of foreign nationals has aroused the interest of 
national security agencies of affected countries in the protection of their citi-
zens. The British police force is said to be active in the Niger Delta, in the 
investigation and facilitation of the release of Britons affected (Bisina, 2003). 
The situation of sea piracy has led to recommendations of a federal waterways 
safety corp. The Bayelsa State governor in August 2003 declared a full war to 
rout out sea piracy. According to him, “this area belongs to all of us. Ours is a 
classic case of transferred aggression” (Akanimo, 2003).
The youth dominance in the present regime of violent agitation and confron-
tations, the emergence of the phenomenon of youth militias and the consequent 
transformation of the intensity, volatility, tenor and methodology of the conflict 
require analytical consideration.
THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The Nigerian population as in all of Africa is quite youthful. A major pro-
portion of the Nigerian population is between the ages of 15-35. Youth ordinar-
ily is a social category of early adulthood, emerging in activity and involvement 
in society but somewhat limited by societal values and some level of depen-
dency and perhaps agency (Durham, 2000). The meaning, definition and specifi-
cation of youth is situational and culture specific. The African concept of youth 
is quite broad in its chronological specification and role. 
As a demographic and social category, the youth possess certain self per-
ceptions, ideas, value systems, attributes and behavior patterns. Placed in rela-
tional terms, the physical, psychological and socio-cultural attributes of youth, 
conjoined with society and its institutions, results in a culture, orientation, and 
behavior (Wyn & White, 1996) particularly, the youths experience consider-
able tensions and conflicts in the process of social and physical maturation and 
in the adjustment to societal realities. The youths struggle for survival, iden-
tity and inclusion. These struggles and challenges shape how the youths as a 
social group respond to or more broadly relate to society and the state in terms 
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of engagement or disengagement, incorporation or alienation, rapprochement or 
resistance, integration or deviance.
In Africa, the peculiar material conditions in which the youth are immersed 
have been anything but friendly and supportive. Specifically, the governance 
and economy of African states have largely created the conditions for the youth 
problematic. Inept and corrupt administrations, poor leaderships, state abuse, 
declining legitimacy and pervading erosion of authority pervades the political 
process. Prolonged militarism, state repression and violence and the accompany-
ing regime of macho-ism, bravado, decisive and summary actions and suppres-
sion have created in the youths a culture that is tolerant of violence (Momoh, 
2000). 
The economic crisis has persisted if not gotten worse. Poverty, immiseration, 
inflation, massive job losses, unemployment, decadent services and infrastruc-
tures and social dislocations persist. Democracy which has been euphorically 
touted as the antidote to these circumstances has been further associated with 
corruption, misrule, violence, and persisting decline. But more importantly, it 
has created a paradox of sorts. While empowering the youths, it has sustained 
the representational limitations as well as the instrumental conception of youth 
as subject to manipulation and violence. In the new democracies therefore, the 
youth have remained a problem segment.
The major manifestations of the state, governance and development crises in 
Africa are youth based. Further, the contradictions of Africa’s political economy 
has made the youth more vulnerable, deprived, neglected and more confronted 
with the “emotive and troubling images” of youth (Muncie, 1999). The difficult 
adjustment to multifarious crises has generated mass disillusionment, frustration 
and anger, and disorientations, public distrust and loss of confidence. Further, 
it has been manifested in the tending of the youth towards shattering, coun-
tering and resisting and undermining the restrictions, controls, ethos, and the 
social fabric of society. The emerging youth orientation has been more asser-
tive, activist and engaging, rebellious, aggressive and violent and devoid of con-
trol and restraint. Its largely negative orientation has produced and is indicated 
in the phenomenon of militia groupings, vigilantes, private armies, child sol-
diers, armed groups, gangsters and secret cults in which the youth has had huge 
participation and with which the African youth has been identified in recent 
years. In Nigeria, this has been indicated in the emergence of youth activ-
ism, radicalism, cultism and an under-class of street urchins (area boys/girls), 
touts and prostitutes (Adisa, 1997). In addition, the youth frustration has been 
directed at and tended towards deviance, delinquency, crime and violence. 
Therefore the youth in Africa can be described as a social category in 
crisis. They have been characterized as excluded, marginalized, threatened, vic-
timized, abused, problematic, frustrated and violent. The anger, frustration and 
bitterness resulting from the multifarious crises and the ensuing negative orien-
tations are compounded by their constituting a large pool that is amenable to 
all sorts of manipulations by political, cultural and other elites and the fact that 
they can easily transform their bitterness and frustration into violence. In the 
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circumstance, it is not surprising that the youths have turned against the society 
and specifically against the public and corporate governance and other objects 
of their marginalization and frustration.
In political terms, the youth represents a contradiction of weakness and 
power. There is at the same time, powerlessness, dependency and a search for 
relevance and space in an adult, elite dominated terrain amidst a youth power 
underlined by the huge potential for political action, rebellion and subversion 
(O’Brien, 1996; Durham, 2000). When the concept of youth is viewed in terms 
of claims to power and power sharing, then what emerges is, in relation to the 
adult category, a contestation between privilege and mass action, autonomy and 
dependency, caution and non-restraint and establishment and counter-hegemony. 
It is in this perspective that the political definition and utility of youth has been 
undertaken in which the youth becomes populist, radical and oppositional. It 
is this appropriation of youth identity in power terms that also underlines the 
youth activism and militancy in political and resource struggles as well as their 
manipulation or utilization in succession and power struggles. 
My central question is: what translates youth frustration and despair into 
mass action, insurgency and confrontations?
Most scholarly works have tended to see the translation as rooted in a nega-
tive youth culture (Olawale, 2003). The source of this culture is regarded vari-
ously. Kaplan (1994) saw it in socio-environmental terms: urban congestions, 
polygamy, disease, environmental stress and superficial religion. What is cre-
ated is a new barbarism of crime and violence. Richards (1996) saw the phe-
nomenon as rooted in the collapse of the educational and social service sys-
tems, unemployment and physical hardships. The emergence of violence and 
armed rebellion is then a response of frustrated youths against a failing or col-
lapsing state and state institutions and services underlined by neo-patrimonial 
practices and political failures. Abdallah (1998) saw the emergence of a nega-
tive youth culture as a subaltern phenomenon, a lumpen class of half educated, 
un-employed and un-employable, informal or underground economy-based, 
marginal youths prone to indiscipline, crime and violence. The lumpen youths 
and their negative culture would transform into opposition and challenge, and 
into constituting the support base for violent struggles. The lumpen youth are 
also at the centre of the emergence of an obsession with violence and violent 
changes. 
These three researchers therefore ascribed the youth involvement in crimi-
nal violence and armed rebellion in a disposing youth culture that is rooted in 
environmental stress (Kaplan, 1994), frustrated youth response to state decay 
(Richards, 1996) and lumpen youths (Abdullah, 1998). A contrary argument has 
been posited by Olawale (2003). In his casualty thesis, he opined that the trans-
formation was a casualty of state weakness and collapse. The weak and failing 
public authorities, neo-patrimonialism, corruption, repression, abuse and other 
manifestations of state decay generate armed insurgencies and civil wars which 
pervert youth culture. 
Situating the phenomenon of youth crime, violence and armed rebellion in a 
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negative youth culture has several weaknesses (Olawale, 2003). First, it gener-
alizes an all inclusive and monolithic negative youth culture and presents it as 
tending in one direction in terms of manifestation and response. But the nega-
tive youth culture may actually be merely a minority youth manifestation within 
diverse, complex and plural youth cultures which are quite visible. The general-
ity of youths, though plagued by the same socio-political, economic and envi-
ronmental catastrophes, retain or exhibit behaviors and dispositions that are pos-
itive and non-rebellious in relation to the state and groups. But this youth seg-
ment, which is perhaps the majority, is neglected in the analysis. Second, the 
much harped on negative youth culture is not specific to Africa. There are ele-
ments of a somewhat globalized youth culture in terms of activism, aggression, 
deviance and ideologies, vocabularies and other tendencies that are general to 
the youths, even outside the continent. But the youth culture, negative as it is, 
has not generated a worldwide cauldron of armed rebellion.
The above literature on youth has been in relation to a specific context: 
Sierra Leone and more broadly, the Mano River States. It may be too simplis-
tic to generalize these postulations to different contexts, even in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is more so when part of the problematic of the concerned schol-
ars was whether youth culture was a cause or casualty of state collapse, which 
is not germane to us here. This is why I seek other explanations of why the 
youths in the Niger Delta have tended towards militancy and militias in the 
struggles for equity and justice in the political economy of oil. 
Resource-rich environments may create and generate problems and potentials 
that tend towards violent criminality. Richard (1996) noted that the opportu-
nity for illegal exploitation, quick enrichment and the physical hardships associ-
ated with mining in the diamond-rich rain forests of Sierra Leone were attrac-
tions for and a conditioning environment for youth agitation and violence. Apart 
from the opportunities created in resource-rich environments, the pursuits of 
grievances resulting from the configuration of costs and benefits may also gen-
erate resource conflicts, resource-based armed insurgencies and wars. But Collier 
(2000) asserted that the struggle for resource opportunities tended more towards 
conflicts and violence than grievances.
These conditions of frustration arising from economic crisis, grievances aris-
ing from the political economy of resource exploitations and the struggle over 
opportunities, benefits or costs in resource-rich regions may not in themselves 
translate into violent contentions and armed struggles. Certain other conditions 
or conducing factors have to be present. 
The opportunity structure for agitation and struggle shapes the choices of 
marginalized or allegedly oppressed groups and mediate or shape the nature of 
challenge or contention (Esman, 1994). Where the space and avenues for peace-
ful challenges and for civil struggles are so constricted, there may be trans-
formation towards militant and violent contentions. Particularly, the collapse of 
dialogic processes, more especially, the realization or perception of futility or 
non-relevance of dialogue, tends challenges and struggles towards militancy and 
violence (Wilson, 2001). State authoritarianism and repression also tends to con-
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duce political mobilization, political unrests and militant civil struggles (Warren, 
1993). As Zolberg (1968: 67) claimed that constant state coercion stimulated 
the deployment of violence by repressed groups both as an expression of non- 
support and resistance. 
The tendency towards militant and violent contentions is further reinforced 
by the depth of grievances and frustration. As Esman (1994) noted, beyond a 
certain threshold, a frustrated group would challenge even a strong state. Then 
there is the existence of real or perceived threats or aggression. This tends 
to translate agitations into violent challenges supposedly for survival and self 
defense (Esman, 1994: 244). The potential for successful challenge may be a 
motivating factor in militant contentions (Esman, 1994). Weak and collapsing 
states characterized by declining public authorities and legitimacy, and declining 
control over agencies of coercion tend to be more susceptible to violent chal-
lenges.
By way of conceptual clarifications, militancy refers to a combative and 
aggressive activism or engagement in struggles for identified causes. Intense 
militancy can develop into armed engagements and the formation of militias. 
Militancy then may precede or be accompanied by the emergence of militias. 
A militia is an armed, informal civilian group who are engaged in some para- 
military, security, crime and crime-control functions in the projection or defence 
of communal, ethnic, religious and political causes. More specifically, as in 
Africa, militias are usually youths, in some organized form that are engaged in 
vigilantism, crime and crime-control, communal and ethnic wars, resource con-
flicts and struggles for political power. When a militant struggle slides into that 
conducted by militias, the struggle and conflict environment becomes militia 
zed.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research questions include: How do youths perceive and respond to 
resource conflicts? What social, economic and political processes conduce youth 
radicalization and militancy in resource conflicts? What factors transform youth 
alienation and acquiescence into engagement and resistance? What factors enable 
the youth appropriation of ethnic and regional identity and cultural symbols and 
institutions in resource conflicts? Can youth militancy and militias lose focus 
and become so perverted that they become purveyors of insecurity and crime? 
What are the consequences of milita-ized resource conflicts? 
The questions raise the need to investigate three propositions. First, the nature 
of state and MNCs responses to youth agitations conduced the emergence of 
youth militancy and the militias. Second, the youth militancy and militias tend 
to be associated with loss of control and focus resulting in violence and insecu-
rity. Third the militias are imbedded in and sustained by their community and 
ethnic kin.
The study relied on secondary and primary data. Secondary data sources were 
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newspapers, magazines, reports and documents. For primary data, I conducted a 
survey research, two in-depth interview schedules, one with youth militia mem-
bers (YMI) and the other with opinion leaders (OLI), and five focus group dis-
cussion sessions (FGD). The focus group discussions investigated the knowl-
edge, attitudes and perceptions of the dimensions, activities and consequence of 
the militia phenomenon.
The sampling technique was largely purposive. This was in part because of 
the sensitivity of the issues investigated which warranted utmost caution. The 
sample sizes were 50 survey interviewees (SI), 10 in-depth youth militia mem-
ber interviewees (YMI), and 10 in-depth opinion leader interviewees (OLI). The 
size of the focus group discussants (FGD) ranged from 3 to 9. All the research 
interviews and discussion sessions took place between February and April 2003. 
My focus was on the militant youth movements of the Ijaw ethnic group in 
the Niger Delta that spans six of the nine oil producing states in Nigeria: 
Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, Edo, Ondo and Aqua Ibom. The research was conducted in 
Bayelsa State, the main base of the Ijaw and the hotbed of the intense agi-
tation, militia activities and militia confrontations with the state since 1997. 
Because of the logistic and security limitations, the interviews and FGDs were 
conducted in Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa State. I identified and categorized 
the core responses from the YMI, OLI and FGDs. On the basis of the catego-
rization, I provide tables of the response frequency. To ensure complementar-
ity, these categories were broadly related as closely as was possible with the 
response categories of the SI. 
The social characteristics of the samples were quite varied. The youth mili-
tia in-depth interviewees (YMI, 10) comprised youths who were largely in age 
set 20-39 (50%), male (80%), married (90%), Christian (100%) and of the 
Ijaw ethnic group (100%). They were educated at the secondary school level 
and beyond (100%) and were mostly public servants or businessmen or self 
employed (90%). The opinion leader in-depth (OLI) sample (10) comprised 
respondents who were in the age sets 30-39 (50%) and 40-49 (50%), male 
(80%), married (80%), Christian (100%), had post secondary education (70%) 
and were either public servants (50%) or businessmen/self employed (50%). The 
survey interview (SI) sample (50) comprised respondents who were between 
30-39 years old (34%) and 40-49 (32%) and were largely male (68%) and mar-
ried (74%). They were Christian (100%), Ijaws (68%), educated at the second-
ary (26%) and post secondary school levels (70%) and were mostly public ser-
vants (60%) and businessmen/women or self -employed (22%).
There were 5 FGDs which altogether had 32 participants. FGD I comprised 
8 participants, FGD II, 8 and FGD III, 3. FGD IV had 8 participants and FGD 
V, 5. The mean ages were FGD I, 32.8; FGD II, 36.4; FGD III, 42.3; FGD IV, 
37.3; and FGD V 33.8. All the participants were from the Niger Delta region 
and were Christians. In terms of over-all representation, they were mostly male 
(87.5%), educated at the secondary (25%) and post secondary levels (50%) and 
public servants (62.5%) or businessmen/women and self-employed (25%). 
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PRESENTATION OF DATA
I. PROFILE OF THE EGBESU MILITIAS
The social profile of the Egbesu militia is that of a largely youthful, male 
Ijaw. It is a recent phenomenon, with most members having joined between 
1995 and 1999. Many are school drop-outs and poorly educated, often from 
the low socio-economic class. Membership is voluntary as personal conviction 
and decision tend to be a stronger influence on membership than peer influ-
ence. Membership tends to be related to the depth of feelings about the alleged 
neglect, marginalization, injustice and under-development against the Ijaw. It 
is also a product of ethnic mobilization as some have joined the militia band-
wagon as a result of ethnic patriotism and solidarity. The process of becoming 
a member involves volunteering, registration and initiation. The latter involves a 
bath in which Egbesu water is sprinkled, the Egbesu spirit is invoked and body 
incision is made.
II. REASONS FOR THE YOUTH MILITIA PHENOMENON
The alleged neglect and marginalization of the Ijaw nation in spite of its 
huge oil contribution is indicated as the major factor that has generated the 
phenomenon (Table 2). This suggests that there is a keen awareness of the situ-







-       - 
21     (42%) 
26     (52%) 
3      (6%) 
-        - 
Sex                      MALE 
FEMALE
50    (100%) 
-        - 
Socio-economic background LOW INCOME 
MIDDLE INCOME   
HIGH INCOME  
45     (90%) 
5     (10%) 
-        - 
Other characteristics SCHOOL DROP- OUTS 
UNEMPLOYED 
OTHERS 
13     (26%) 
20     (40%) 
17     (34%) 
Table 1. Social Profile of Militial Members.
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ation by the Ijaw nation. It further suggests deep and broad grievance relating 
to the issues of intense dissatisfaction with power and resource distribution in 
the Nigerian state. A sampler of reasons adduced from the FGD is quite illu-
minating: “resource exploitation without adequate benefits,” “we contribute so 
much and get so little;” “neglect by the federal government and oil companies,” 
and “people (state officials) usurp authority and allocate resources irrationally to 
favor their group.” Quite related to ethnic marginalization is political exclusion 
and inequity in the Nigerian state. In fact, the YMI and FGDs regard this as a 
major factor in the struggle and its militia-ization.
Unemployment and poverty are major problems that facilitate the phenom-
enon. Particularly unemployment among the educated youths has radicalized 
them. The FGDs indicated that “when 80% of our youths are unemployed,” “the 
harsh conditions have become unbearable,” “when those marginalized are now 
hungry, they brazenly resort to violence.” But beyond these seeming altruistic 
factors are the roles of politicians and opinion leaders. The militia phenomenon 
is to some extent a creation of political, ethnic and community leaders, who 
encourage, sponsor and control the militia groups for some political and per-
sonal objectives. This is clearly indicated in the SI sample response (Table 2). 
The phenomenon is also a result of the attitude of the state and the MNCs 
to use force and to repress agitation. The repression of “dialogue or constitu-
tional means of achieving desired goals by the minorities to fail” (FGD). The 
responses from the FGD are quite illustrative: When “those in authority instead 
SI FGD YMI  
Respondents Reasons No. % No. % No. %
Ethnic marginalization/ 
  neglect
16 32 16 50 3 30
Political exclusion and 
  inequity
2 4 5 16 3 30
Unemployment 15 30 4 13 - -
Poverty 5 10 2 6 - -
Political manipulation  7 14 - - - -
Youth exuberance 2 4 - - - -
Ethnic solidarity 3 6 - - - -
State repression/ 
  configuration
- - 2 6 3 30
Attitude of MNCs  - - 3 9 1 10
Total  50 100 32 100 10 100
Table 2. Reasons for the Youth Militia Phenomenon.
SI: Survey Interviewees
FGD: Focus Group Discussants
YMI: Youth Militia Iterviewees
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of negotiating or attending to demands, resort to confrontation and ultimatum, 
then the other groups resort to violence,” or when the youths feel that “their 
grievances would not be acceded to by the state,” and when “people have 
become more conscious that you cannot get anything by peaceful means,” “violence 
becomes inevitable,” or “the minority groups are oppressed,” “we are being 
exploited,” and “the fastest way to address our grievances is direct action.” 
Thus militancy and violence is the last resort in the relations and contestation 
between the ethnic youth groups and the state and the MNCs.
While there are considerable similarities in the responses of the 3 research 
samples relating to ethnic marginalization and political exclusion, there are some 
differences. For example, political exclusion and inequity and state repression 
are more important as reasons underlying the militia phenomenon for the YMI, 
while unemployment and poverty are important for the SI and FGDs.
III. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE YOUTH MILITIAS
The primary objective of the militia and militia activities is the strug-
gle against marginalization and injustice, the emancipation and survival of the 
Ijaw nation and the Niger Delta and the promotion of ethnic interests in terms 
of welfare (Table 3). Quite related is the redress of the neglect and under- 
development to which the Ijaw nation has been subjected. More specifically, the 
militias want to address what is considered as the long overdue disadvantages 
in political representation, resource distribution and developmental attention. 
Other objectives pertain to issues that enhance ethnic justice, welfare and sur-
Table 3: THE OBJECTIVES OF YOUTH MILITIAS 
Respondents YMI OLI SI FGD
Objectives No. % No. % No. % No. %
Struggle against injustice/neglect 4 40 7 70 8 16 9 28
Search for ethnic emancipation, 
survival interest 
2 20 3 30 12 24 11 34
True federalism  - - - - 6 12 - -
Increase share of oil revenues - - - - 11 22 3 9
Redress, neglect and 
underdevelopment 
1 10 - - - - 4 12
Security - - - - 8 16 - -
Self-determination  1 10 - - 2 4 3 9
Increased political representation  2 20 - - 3 6 2 6
Total 10 100 10 100 50 100 32 99
OLI: Opinion Leader Interviewees 
Table 3. The Objectives of Youth Militias.
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vival as well as more benefits from oil; including self-determination, true feder-
alism and resource control. 
The neglect, injustice and marginalization of the region and the struggle for 
emancipation and survival and ethnic interests are the major objectives indi-
cated by all the sample groups. The issue of increased political representation is 
important to the YMI and SI. Increased share of oil revenues and security are 
also important to the SI. That security is highlighted may suggest that to the 
general public, the youth militia provision of security is seen as a reason for 
their existence.
IV. OPERATIONAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROFILE OF THE YOUTH 
MILITIAS 
The militia members attempt to address their grievances and achieve objec-
tives through enlightening and sensitizing the public, the public expression of 
articulated grievances through representation and access to the media and press 
statements. As Table 4 indicates, the youth militias particularly seek dialogue 
and attention, representation and media coverage. Thereafter, there may be 
peaceful protests and rallies that sometimes turn violent. These efforts usually 
fail. The state and MNCs are rarely disposed. As one OLI noted, “it is always 
difficult to dialogue with the Nigerian government.”
It is when demands and efforts are ignored that the militia members resort 
to what they consider as direct action which is usually violent in order to com-
pel public, state or MNCs attention or intervention. Violence is the means of 
expressing annoyance and compelling attention. It is the last resort. The usual 
target of violence is the MNCs facilities and operations. As one FGD noted, 
“the only way to attack the federal government is to stop the operation of the 
oil companies’ through violence.” The violent mode of operation is reinforced 
by their equipment with arms and diabolical power. The violent method is more 
preferred because the state is usually confrontational. 
As Table 4 indicates, rallies, protests and direct actions are the most common 
tactics utilized by the militias. These are very loud, visible, volatile and explo-
sive, in terms of placement of issues in the public agenda with violent, destruc-
tive and disruptive consequences. But as long as these tactics yield results, they 
constitute the more effective method. 
The failure of representations and dialogue in the relations with MNCs, is 
stated thus by one FGD: 
“In my community, we have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
with the MNCs to develop some projects. After a year, nothing was 
done. The youths decided to hold their management hostage. We went 
to their company, seized ten of their staff including expatriates. We 
brought them to the community. After a while, the MNCs agreed to go 
by the MOU. Today, there are some improvements. It is only when the 
people spring to action those they usually accomplishing their MOU.”
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V. ACTIVITY PROFILE OF YOUTH MILITIAS
Within their communities, the youth militias act as guards. They are the 
fighting arm of communities in the contentions, conflicts and local wars over 
land, MNCs locations and water resources with neighboring communities and in 
the event of the encroachment, damage or worse against community members 
and resources. They prevent crime, arrest and try and expel criminals in their 
communities. Some FGD indicated that they are used in some communities as a 
“vigilante group to check the activities of thieves and to track down criminals.” 
The militia members also participate in community development. They mobilize 
community members for community projects and communal activities. Some-
times this is under threat of force.
Furthermore, the militias sensitize the citizenry concerning issues and griev-
ances in the Niger Delta conflict. They organize protests and demonstrations to 
express the plight, sufferings and grievances of the region. Through various mil-
itant groups, the militias participate in the generalized issuance of ultimata and 
direct actions against the MNCs as part of the agitation of the groups against 
the state and the MNCs. The range of actions as identified by the respondents 
include stoppage or disruption of oil production and operations, kidnapping of 
MNCs staff, hijack or take-over of facilities, piracys, manhandling of MNCs 
staff, damage to MNCs facilities, etc. In this realm, the militia members seek to 
operate outside the ambit of their elders and more specifically, outside the oper-
ational modes of petitions and peaceful and lawful agitation utilized with little 
success by their elders.
In the relations with the MNCs, the youth militia seek to force contribution 
to the development of their communities. They do this through seeking a mem-
orandum of understanding (MOU) or at the very least, a package of develop-
Table 4: OPERATIONAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROFILE OF YOUTH MILITIAS 
YMI OLI FGDRespondents
Tactics No. % No. % No. %
Enlightenment and 
sensitization 
2 20 - - 3 9
Dialogue 2 20 3 30 10 31
Rallies and protest 3 30 3 30 8 25
Direct actions against oil 
companies 
3 30 3 30 4 13
Community security - - - - 4 13
Others - - 1 10 3 9
Total  10 10 32 100100100
Table 4. Operational and Methodological Profile of Youth Militias.
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ment programs from the MNCs and actions are taken to compel negotiation, 
signing and implementation of the MOU. Apart from the MOU, some mili-
tia groups collect regular funds from the MNCs. One FGD called it “standing 
monthly money from the MNCs” which the militia members may share among 
themselves and community members or devote to community development, as 
the case in a community in Ogbia, Rivers State.
VI. PERCEPTION OF THE YOUTH MILITIAS
The respondents in the various samples tend to see the youth militia as orga-
nized standing groups of youths who protect certain ethnic interests and rights 
and forcefully make demands on the state, oil companies or other ethnic group-
ings. They are youth pressure groups that utilize militant methods and violence 
to compel speedy resolution of their grievances and the enforcement of deci-
sions or actions in favor of their communal and ethnic interests. The defining 
characteristic is the readiness for physical combat, confrontation and the taking 
up of arms. 
The militias are seen to be aggressive and violent (Table 5) as well as fear-
ful, hostile and lawless. These perceptions result from the aggressive, militant, 
confrontational and violent methods of operation and the excesses such as the 
harassment and intimidation of community members and opponents. In fact, 
OLI SI FGDRespondents
Characteristic Profile No. % No. % No. %
Patriotic 3 30 - - 9 28
Intelligent and highly aware - - - - - -
Aggressive and violent 2 20 40 80 14 44
Supportive and friendly 1 10 5 10 - -
Lawless - - 5 10 9 28
Fearful and hostile 2 20 - - - -
Frustrated and self serving  1 10 - - - -
Others 1 10 - - - -
Total 10 100 50 100 32 100
Table 5. Perception of Militia Members.
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many OLI indicate that the militia harass community members, exhibit elements 
of criminality and engage in crime and extra judicial murders. This means that 
there is not just loss of focus, but also loss of control on the part of the youth 
militia.
Positive images co-exist for the youth militias as well. They are patriotic to 
the ethnic cause and interests and supportive in community development and 
crime management. Some OLI regard them as morally sound and emotionally 
stable. Some FGD stated: “the militias are very useful and we respect them,” 
and “They are useful in direct actions against the MNCs to press home com-
munity demands and grievances in the negotiations” with the MNCs. Or “Sometimes, 
they represent the community,” and “We support the militia as they demonstrate 
and tell the world our anger and grievances.” 
VII. FACTORS AFFECTING YOUTH MILITIA SUCCESS 
The militia members agree that very little of their objectives have been 
achieved. But they attribute the achievements to considerable commitment 
of members, the assistance of Egbesu and ethnic solidarity and support. The 
Egbesu deity is believed to give them invincibility. The OLI while accepting 
the militia commitment and focus see ethnic solidarity and popular support as 
the main factors facilitating activities and achievements. This indicates that the 
militias thrive on not just the ethnicity but popular support as well within the 
ethnic group. It is in this sense that some refer to them as communal and eth-
nic militias. 
The factors hindering the achievement of militia objectives are thought to 
be both internal and external (Table 7). Internal factors are weaknesses of the 
youth militia groups and bands, of low education, selfishness and greed among 
members, poor political control indicated in indiscipline, disunity and loss of 
focus. External to the YMI is the attitude of the state and MNCs which are 
seen as insensitive and repressive. State policies, too, have tended towards a 
divide-and-rule strategy to weaken the militias and undermine their support. The 
Table 6: REASONS FOR YOUTH MILITIA SUCCESSES 
Respondents YMI      OLI 
Reasons No. No.
Ethnicity solidarity 1 2
Popular support 2 3
Myth/might of Egbesu 3 1
Commitment and focus of members  3 3
Others 1 1
Total 10 10
Table 6. Reasons for Youth Militia Successes.
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YMI see the federal government, particularly state officials, the MNCs the eth-
nic majorities and the political elites as the groups that oppose their existence. 
This opinion is similar to that held by the OLI. Some political elites, particu-
larly selfish political appointees and leaders, and those regarded as saboteurs are 
also blamed. 
VIII. THE SOCIAL BASE OF THE YOUTH MILITIAS 
The YMI indicate co-operative and cordial relations with most social groups 
(Table 8). But the most co-operative relations tend to be with the ethnic asso-
ciations, followed by the traditional rulers, the artisans and the poor. The 
least co-operative relations are with the elites and market women. This may 
be explained by the fact that these groups have more stakes in the local and 
national economies and therefore may have been more wary of the disruptions 
occasioned by militia activities.
The OLI responses about the nature of relations fairly corroborated that of 
the YMI. The SI responses also indicated supportive relationships with the pol-
iticians, ethnic associations and ethnic kins at home and abroad. The percep-
OLI         YMI  Respondents
Factors No No
Loss of focus  2 -
Inadequate funding 2 -
Poor political control 1 -
Weaknesses of members and militia groups 2 2
Attitude of federal government and MNCs 3 8
Total 10 10
Table 7. Factors Hindering Achievement of Objectives.
Social groups     
Relations 
Traditional rulers Ethnic associations The high social 
economic class 
The poor Artisans Market  
women 
Co-operative 3 7 1 3 3  2
Cordial 7 3 6 7 7  7
Not cordial - - 2 - -  1
Conflicting - - 1 - -  ‐
Total 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table 8. The Youth Militia Relations with Social Groups (Ymi).
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tion of co-operative and cordial relations and perhaps support by some social 
groups in the community, clan and ethnic areas may be related to the utility of 
the militias in security and the compelling of MNCs to dialogue in relation to 
MOU agreements, and indicate that the militias are firmly rooted in the com-
munities and ethnic groups. 
IX. IMPACT OF THE YOUTH MILITIAS ON THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT
The militias have contributed to the Niger Delta struggle and politics in 
three major ways (Table 9): the articulation of ethnic interests, the elicitation 
of greater benefits in the oil economy and crime management. In the first, the 
militias have highlighted significantly the meager benefits and heavy costs of 
the oil economy to the region and have campaigned for justice, fairness and 
equity in the distribution of the benefits of the oil economy. In the second area 
of impact, the militias have compelled benefits to their communities and the 
region from the oil companies and the state, of which the greatest manifesta-
tion is the MNCs increasing resort to reaching a MOU with host communities. 
The state has also been more concerned about the development of the region. 
The third impact of the militias has been the deterring and curtailing of crime 
in the communities. 
But the youth militias have also contributed immensely to the heightening 
of conflicts, violence, insecurity and instability in the region (Table 9), as com-
munity-based militias sometimes fight their traditional rulers, elders and tradi-
Table 9: IMPACT OF YOUTH MILITIA ACTIVITIES  
SI FGDRespondents
Consequences of Militia activities No. % No. %
Ethnic intolerance - - - -
Peaceful co-existence through 
mutual ethnic deterrence  
2 4 2 6
Furthering of ethnicity progress, 
unity and cultural awareness  
- - - -
Promotion of justice, equity and 
fairness
8 16 1 3
Undermining of law, order, 
security and safety 
12 24 7 22
Undermining of  democracy, 
national unity and development 
24 48 4 13
Crime management  - - 10 31
Attention and development 4 8 8 25
Total 50 100 32 100
Table 9. Impact of Youth Militia Activities. 
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tional governance structures over spoils from MNCs or divergences of opinion. 
As one FDG participant stated, “Some traditional rulers such as in Ikereuion 
local government area (LGA) in Bayelsa are in exile and operate from Port 
Harcourt or Yenagoa, because of the way the militias threaten them.” Further-
more, the militias are used to harass and intimidate, to organize protests and 
to create fear among the citizenry, and to chase out of the communities some 
political and opinion leaders whose opinion is at variance with their activities 
and methods. Thus the militias are constricting the terrain of peaceful demo-
cratic competition and creating a regime of violent politics. 
X. THE STATE OF THE MILITIAS
There is considerable commitment of militia members to the militia cause 
and a fair level of cordial relationship between the youth militia leaderships 
and followers. However, there are internal problems of balkanization, disunity, 
factionalization and internal conflicts according to the YMI. Unlike at the ini-
tial stages of activity, they are now more localized and centered around cer-
tain prominent militia members. Some militia members are now involved in sea 
piracy, vandalization of pipelines, cannibalization of oil installations, bunkering 
and other forms of economic crimes and violence. As the Governor of Delta 
State has noted, “the genuine struggle for Niger Delta development has not 
been focused,” as many activities of the militias are illegal, unlawful and vio-
lent (Gbemedu, 2003). Some militia members have become rogues and criminals 
who harass their communities and opponents. Some have become toll collectors 
from the oil servicing companies and contractors. Even community development 
projects have been disrupted for reasons of selfish accumulation. Some MNCs 
and their contractors are afraid to clean oil spillage sites or to undertake proj-
ects because of militia harassment, extortion and threats. 
The disarray is partly due to the decline in the militant activities of the 
youths since 2000. With less activism and actions in favor of oil-based ethnic 
and regional grievances, the militia has become less cohesive and focused. This 
has created the opportunities for pursuing self-interest even in the interactions 
with the MNCs. There are incidences of hijack, kidnapping, ransom demands 
and other forms of actions that are underpinned by the desire to obtain funds 
for private purposes from the MNCs. Some of the militias are transforming the 
Niger Delta struggle into criminality for self-interest and private accumulation. 
The support and use of the youth militias by political, civil and commu-
nity leaders are particularly turning some of the militias into instruments for 
brigandage, harassment, intimidation, violence and crime. The FGD responses 
indicate that the militias have become or are being used as political thugs to 
achieve the selfish and personal objectives of some political leaders. 
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SUMMARY OF SURVEY FINDINGS
My investigation found that the militias are poor, poorly educated, and unem-
ployed youths who were a product of ethnic mobilization and solidarity in rela-
tion to ethnic grievances and interests in the oil economy. Mobilization has par-
ticularly resulted from ethnic neglect and marginalization. At the personal level, 
there is the aggravation of poverty and unemployment which has predisposed 
the youths. The objectives of the militias are the redressing of inequity and 
injustice relating to political representation, resource distribution and develop-
mental attention.
The militia methods of operation commenced with the peaceful. But their 
recurring failure has conduced rallies and protests, and direct actions character-
ized with violence and armed encounters. Outside the relations with the MNCs 
and the state, the militias are involved in crime management, protection of 
communal members and resources, and community development.
The dominant perception of the militias by community members is that of 
aggressive, violent and fearful youngsters. But the youth militancy is highly 
regarded because it is a bold and courageous response to the state, and 
because the MNCs only respond to violence. The militias have cordial and co- 
operative relations with and support from most groupings in the ethnic region, 
such as traditional rulerships, ethnic associations, politicians, the poor and eth-
nic kin. The achievement of the militias is attributed to member commitment, 
ethnic solidarity and popular support, and the assistance of the Egbesu deity. 
Apart from the attitude of the MNCs and the state, other factors that limit mili-
tia activities and achievements are the loss of focus and the weaknesses of the 
militia members. 
The militia activities while furthering crime control, enhancing developmen-
tal attention and facilitating greater equity and fairness in the oil economy, has 
undermined law, order, security, democracy and national unity. The state of the 
militias has further contributed to factional fighting, crime, violence and insecu-
rity.
THE PHASES OF THE NIGER DELTA STRUGGLE
The Niger Delta struggle for environmental, social and political equity and 
justice has taken place in five phases. 
The first phase, which was prior to independence, began first as an agita-
tion for special developmental attention because of the unique ecological diffi-
culties. The region, the third largest wetland in the world, comprising estuaries, 
swamps, rivers, rivulets, creeks, mangrove swamp and lowland rain forest, is a 
difficult terrain with enormous developmental challenges. Second, it was also 
part of the minority agitation for special protection and development guarantees. 
The agitation in part resulted in the establishment of the Willinks Commis-
sion of 1958. Its recommendation led to the establishment of the Niger Delta 
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Development Board (NDDB) in 1962. The struggle at this phase was a region 
wide political agitation led by political leaders such as Harold Dappa Biriye of 
the Rivers Movement. The discovery and commercial production of oil in the 
region intensified the agitation as it began to include the equitable reward and 
benefits from oil.
The second phase was a militant, brief phase in 1966. Following the weak-
nesses of the NDDB and continued under-development and neglect of the 
region, a group of youths led by Isaac Adaka Boro, then a former cadet sub-
inspector, from present day Bayelsa State, led youths in the Delta Volunteer 
Force (VLF) to declare a separate state of “Niger Delta Peoples Republic” from 
Nigeria on 23 February 1966. Their actions included recruitment and arming of 
militants and the seizure and disruption of oil production in Oloibiri. The VLF 
was suppressed and its members arrested, prosecuted and convicted for treason.
The third phase from the 1970s saw disparate, un-coordinated and local-
ized conflicts by host communities (HCs) against the MNCs. The communi-
ties abandoned to poverty and lack of basic facilities and infrastructure even in 
the midst of the oil boom of the 1970s, began to direct their grievances against 
the MNCs. They demanded the provision of basic facilities such as roads, elec-
tricity, pipe-borne water, health and educational facilities. There were also agi-
tations for compensation for damaged crops and croplands and cleaning of 
oil spillages. The most militant of the methodology of this era was the non- 
violent protests mainly involving blockages of the access roads to oil facilities 
and occupation of oil facilities. 
The fourth phase (1990–1996) was occasioned first, by the insensitivity 
of MNCs and the state to HCs agitations. Second but more importantly, the 
state supported by MNCs became more repressive against the HCs agitation 
through attacks and murders, thus destroying the protesting communities, includ-
ing Umuechem and Ogoni in Rivers State. Third, there was increased aware-
ness of oil-based environmental degradation and the state-perpetrated injustice 
and neglect of the region. This led to the highlighting of the environmental 
and political dimensions of the struggle. The Niger Delta people began to orga-
nize the struggles through civil, community, ethnic and regional groupings. The 
annulment of the presidential elections of 1993, and the ensuing political crisis 
also led to the blossoming of more groups. 
The first major group was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) which led the Ogoni people in massive environmental protests 
against Shell’s environmental degradation. The Ogoni Bill of Rights in August 
1990 contained demands which included compensation, environmental remedia-
tion and ethnic autonomy. Other emerging groups addressed the political dimen-
sions of the struggle for increased attention, resource allocation and the redress 
of inequalities in political representation. The groups in the constitutional con-
ference of 1994–1995 won the concession of an increased allocation of 13% of 
oil revenues based on the derivation principle.
The heightening of the environmental and political dimension in this phase, 
particularly the highly mobilized and coordinated Ogoni mass movement was 
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met by intense repression from the state. The Ogoni region was militarized and 
the special military task force under Major Paul Okutimo terrorized the Ogoni 
region between 1992 and 1998. In 1995, after a kangaroo trial between 1994 
and 1995, nine leaders of the MOSOP struggle, including its leader, Ken Saro 
Wiwa were hanged. The terrible repression of the Ogoni, rather than suppress, 
radicalized and intensified the struggle.
The fifth phase (1997–2004) has been characterized with a massive mobi-
lization of the communities and people by communal, ethnic, pan-ethnic and 
regional groups, the activism and concern of civil, human and environmental 
rights groups and the political class, youth militancy and ethnic militias, massive 
disruptions of oil production and violent confrontations (Ikelegbe, 2001). The 
fifth phase has also been characterized by numerous shifts. First, this has been 
in the take-over of the activism and actions by the youths. Second has been in 
the shift of focus with the political elites and activist youths, from accommoda-
tive agitations to those of self-determination, self-governance and greater politi-
cal autonomy (Osaghae, 2001: 10-11). Third has been the shift from the MNCs 
to the state as the target of agitation. The demands have become largely envi-
ronmental and political, including self-determination, true federalism, resource 
control, state-restructuring through a national sovereign conference, the abroga-
tion of obnoxious laws, environmental remediation and reparation for ecological 
devastation. Finally, there has been a shift from the merely obstructive methods 
of protests to direct actions and violent encounters.
THE ROAD TO MILITANCY AND MILITIA-IZATION
Oil wealth was used to develop other parts of Nigeria while the Niger 
Delta region was abandoned. The region has not gained from its oil produc-
tion. The region remains one of the poorest in Nigeria in terms of infrastruc-
ture, facilities, services, non-oil-based industries and other development indica-
tors (OMPADEC, 1994: 8). 
Politically, the region has been at the margin of the federal power configura-
tion with scant political representation underlined by majority ethnic hegemony 
over the minority groups of the region. Furthermore, it has been disadvantaged 
in the resource distribution system as the region which received 50% alloca-
tion from the revenues derived from its oil resources in 1960 and 45% in 1970, 
had its allocation progressively decline to 20% in 1982, 1.5% in 1984 and 3% 
in 1992. The generalized and militant agitations compelled its upward review to 
13% in 1999. 
Due to the profound national economic crisis, the region’s population is still 
largely impoverished, hungry and unemployed. There is misery, hardship, sor-
row, hopelessness and neglect among the people. This has been compounded 
by the fact that oil exploitation has brought environmental pollution, ecologi-
cal disasters and socio-economic deprivation. It has wasted scarce land and fish-
ing waters and dislocated primary occupations, culture and communal gover-
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nance and created no direct benefit nor participation in the oil activities. There 
have been anger, bitterness, grief, frustration, disillusionment and disenchant-
ment among the people and a deep sense of injustice, inequity and unfairness 
(Ezomon, 1999). Distrust and loss of confidence pervade the relationship 
between the oil producing region, the MNCs and the state. The result has been 
friction, tension, restiveness, hostility and a penchant for militancy and violence. 
The communities are very hostile and on the edge, with minor disagreements 
resulting in conflagrations of violence. Expectedly this has been more intense 
among the youths. 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of avenue for articulation, discussion and nego-
tiation of problems and issues of disagreement and conflict, either with the state 
or the MNCs. The promises and statements of the state and MNCs have often 
turned empty. Even agreements with the oil companies are seldom adhered to. 
The other factor was that the democratic, state and economic reform projects 
in Nigeria between 1986 and 1999 provided the tinder box. The pro-democracy 
struggles and protests against economic reform, political transition and human 
rights policies and practices of the Babangida and Abacha regimes in Nigeria’s 
major cities involved direct actions in the form of violent demonstrations, pro-
tests and riots. The state reacted with repression. 
Further, the 1993 annulment of the presidential elections clearly won by a 
southwestern Nigerian brought out the injustice and inequity of the Nigerian 
Federation, of which the Niger Delta was a victim. This raised to the front 
burner, the political issues of true federalism and national conference of eth-
nic nationalities as part of the democratic, liberal and state reform struggle as 
well as that by oppressed and marginalized nationalities. The Niger Delta crisis 
became part of the democratic struggle and concern of civil democratic groups 
and activists. These wider political dimensions emboldened the youths and made 
their actions more consequential.
Another factor was the prevailing response of massive repression by the state 
and MNCs to the Niger Delta agitation. The state repression of the Ogoni, the 
execution of the “Ogoni Nine,” including the novelist and foremost environmen-
tal rights campaigner Ken Saro-Wiwa, and the continued repression of protest-
ing communities made glaring the pattern of state response and the anticipation 
and response to further agitation. 
By the mid-1990s, increased state repression, the growing insensitivity of 
the oil companies and the state and the persisting trickles of benefits emerg-
ing from the state and oil companies indicated the failure of the HCs methods 
of relations with the state and MNCs. More importantly, the youths had lost 
confidence in their traditional power structures and opinion leaders. The youths 
began to disdain the HCs methods against the state and MNCs as weak, fear-
ful, docile and ineffective in seeking access, dialogue and agreements with an 
insensitive and arrogant state and exploitative and socially irresponsible MNCs. 
The youths sought immediate address of their grievances. 
Rather than weaken or create fear, prevalent state repression hardened and 
radicalized the youths. Militancy has become the only option and the youths 
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have had to prepare to confront the state. The militia phenomenon was a direct 
consequence of state repression and militarization of the Niger Delta region. 
Thus militancy became a more recurring feature against the MNCs since the 
late 1990s. The communities began to resort to extra-legal means to compel 
MNCs negotiations and settlements. More specifically, the communities and eth-
nic groups led by youths began direct actions of seizure and occupation of oil 
facilities, sabotage of MNCs pipelines and related facilities and disruptions of 
oil production. 
YOUTH MILITANCY IN THE NIGER DELTA STRUGGLE
Youth militancy was first incubated in the Ijaw ethnic group. This is partly 
because of its size as the largest ethnic group in the region and consequently a 
large base of unemployed and educated youths and seat of the anger, bitterness 
and hostility, resulting from pervading poverty, neglect and marginalization. 
The first sign of generalized youth restiveness and emerging militancy was 
the emergence of youth groups in various communities which began to chal-
lenge the communal and ethnic traditional leaderships and to assert their place 
and roles in the communities and in the struggle. The youth groups proliferated 
across communities, clans and kingdoms of the Ijaw ethnic group. The second 
main development was the formation of numerous civil youth groups which 
spanned communities and sometimes the ethnic group and the direction of their 
objectives and activity towards the oil economy. Prominent among these in 
mobilization and activity were the Chicoco Movement and the Movement for 
the Survival of the Izon Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEND).
The realization of the ineffectiveness of several militant youth groups of vari-
ous communities and militant civil groups led to the founding of an umbrella 
youth association imperative. The leadership qualities of activists and educated 
youths such as Timi Ogoruba (MOSIEND) and Oronto Douglas (Chicoco Move-
ment) were also a factor particularly in the emergence of the Ijaw Youth Coun-
cil and the Kaiama Declaration. These developments can be regarded as the 
beginning of a solid platform for a widespread, integrated, highly mobilized and 
educated youth activism. Thus also emerged a platform for educated, conscious 
and activist youths to assume leadership of the struggle and to undertake uni-
fied youth actions particularly among the Ijaws. Further, the development facili-
tated a movement of educated youth militant activism which soon spread to and 
facilitated the formation of ethnic youth groups among the Isokos, Ogbias, Egis, 
Urhobos and other ethnic groups in the Niger Delta.
The youth militancy signaled huge changes in the Niger Delta struggle. First, 
the direct actions of youths against the state and MNCs, which hitherto was in 
disparate disruptions and attacks in the communities, became coordinated, ethnic 
and large-scale direct actions. The organized youth militant groups took over 
the struggles and the community youths became mere agents who responded to 
directives of ethnic wide youth associations. Second, youth militancy vigorously 
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transformed the object of agitation from the socio-economic demands of devel-
opment to the political dimensions of resolving the conflict. Public policy and 
state responses to the Niger Delta assumed the centre stage. Third, the griev-
ance was targeted against the Nigerian state’s insensitivity, neglect and the ten-
dency for repression and violence against the Niger Delta peoples while col-
luding with the MNCs. Further, the struggle became that of political resolution 
through state reform: self-determination, federal restructuring, resource control 
and a national conference of ethnic nationalities. The youth also began to seek 
employment, contracts, equity participation in the oil economy, and relocation of 
the headquarters of the MNCs to the region.
The militant youths also placed the human and environmental rights dimen-
sions of the conflict on the front burner. The struggle as it were became, in 
part, a challenge to the environmentally un-sustainable operations and prac-
tices of the MNCs which have grossly degraded their environment. The militant 
youths sought environmental cleaning and remediation and adequate compensa-
tion for environmental damages.
With the political re-direction of agitation, the MNCs assumed a second order 
level as object of conflict. The youths disrupted oil flow and state revenues 
to draw national and international attention and sympathy to themselves and 
their cause (Ezomon, 1999). The youth militancy eventually engaged in a much 
wider range of attacks which included confrontations with security agents, kid-
napping of MNCs staff and hijack of MNCs helicopters and boats. 
Finally, the militant youth activism and the accompanying intense repres-
sion and militarization of the region that ensued led to the militia-ization of 
the struggle. In the Ijaw area, the Egbesu emerged as a standing armed group. 
The militia phenomenon in the various communities and militant groups raised 
the frequency, scale and intensity of violent encounters against the state and the 
MNCs.
I. THE IJAW MILITANT ETHNIC MOVEMENTS
There are several militant youth groups in the region. Within the Ijaw ethnic 
group, there are the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Move-
ment for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEND), the Ijaw 
Youth Council (IYC), Niger Delta Resistance Movement (NDRM) and the Niger 
Delta Oil Producing Communities Development Organization.
Among these, the IYC is the apex youth association. The FNDIC has been 
the most consistently active and militant in Delta state, where it has since 1997 
been engrossed in militant confrontations with the Itsekiri, the MNCs and the 
state. 
1. The Ijaw Youth Council (IYC)
The IYC is the umbrella association of youth groups in the Ijaw nation. It 
was formed in 1998 at Kaiama, headquarters of Kikokuma Opokuma LGA in 
Bayelsa State, following a meeting of over 5000 youths from 25 associations, 
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500 communities and 40 clans in the Ijaw Nation. The IYC was initially led by 
a collegiate leadership of seven which included Felix Tuodolo, Oronto Douglas, 
Bedford Abuele, Valentine Kuku, Roland Oweinanabo and Isaac Osuaka. The 
present president is Alhaji Asari Dokubo. The IYC has a national executive and 
zonal executives for the East, Central and Western Zones. 
The IYC main objectives are the increased attention and development, abro-
gation of obnoxious policies that deprive the Ijaws of ownership and con-
trol of their resources, de-militarization of the region, self determination, fed-
eral restructuring, resource control and a sovereign national conference of eth-
nic nationalities. On 11 December 1998, it made the now popular Kaiama 
Declaration which declared its objectives, strategies and methods to include non-
recognition of undemocratic laws that deprive the Ijaws of the ownership and 
control of their resources. They gave an ultimatum for oil companies to vacate 
their land, pending the resolutions of the issues in conflict, which expired on 
30 December 1999. 
Following the Kaiama Declaration, the IYC through Operation Climate 
Change and Operation Warfare, commenced the shut down of oil installations 
and the resistance against militarization, military attacks and repression in the 
Niger Delta in 1999. In January 1999, the Egbesu Boys, the militia arm of 
the IYC in response to military attacks and militarization of the Ijaw region, 
attacked military checkpoints and the military in the streets of Yenagoa, East-
West Express Road, Ekeki Yenagoa and Kaiama. The police station at Kaiama 
and Odi were sacked (Suleiman, 1999; Igbokwe, 1999; Ikwunze et al., 1999).
The IYC is a very militant organization, which has been the arrowhead of 
the youth actions and confrontations with oil companies and the state since its 
formation in late 1998. The IYC represents the political arm of the militant 
struggle while the Egbesu represents the spiritual arm. 
But the IYC is not all militancy. Even in the Kaiama Declaration and Opera-
tion Climate Change that followed in 1999, it sought genuine negotiations with 
the state and MNCs (Osunde, 1999). The IYC has been willing to enter into 
dialogue. Since 2000, the IYC has insisted on dialogue but also threatened mass 
actions to realize the objectives of resource control, self-determination and true 
federalism. It has continued to agitate against the inadequacy of the 13% deri-
vation, militarization and military occupation of oil facilities and the slow-paced 
establishment and poor funding of the Niger Delta Development Commission. 
Its militancy in recent times has been more in the form of protests and ral-
lies. It threatened to shut all gas and oil flow stations, if by 29 May 2000, Odi 
in Bayelsa State was not re-built. The threat was not carried out. The IYC has 
organized protests in various Ijaw towns. In May 2000 in Port Harcourt, it held 
a rally and procession attended by over 8000 youths to commemorate the death 
of former Ijaw hero and activist, Major Isaac Boro (Onwuemeodo, 2000).
2. The Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC)
The FNDIC is a Western Ijaw group with headquarters at Oporoza, 
Gbaramatu clan in Warri Southwest LGA of Delta State. The FNDIC was 
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formed early in the cause of the Ijaw/Itsekiri conflict. It was the main youth 
vanguard and warfare arm of the conflict. Being an Ijaw group, it became 
involved in the crises between the Ijaws and the federal government over 
the economy of oil (Ikwunze et al., 1999). Its spokesman is Frank Omare 
while other officials include Chief Lucky Oromini, George Timinimi, Lucky 
Izuokuwor and Chief David Pere (Ikwunze & Ogoigbe, 1999). 
It is an armed group of youths that has been involved in violent encoun-
ters with the oil companies, the state and their Itsekiri neighbors. In the 
January 1999 encounters with the military in Bayelsa State, it declared about 
January 5 that it had dispatched more youths to Bayelsa to defend the Ijaws 
there. In October 1998, the FNDIC issued a letter threatening to commence full-
scale insurrection and asked MNCs and foreigners to leave the region, because 
of the neglect, impoverishment and harassment of leaders of HCs (Suleiman, 
1999). The FNDIC rejected the truce called by the Niger Delta Volunteer Force 
in January 1999. It also rebuffed the 1999 peace initiative of Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo as a presidential candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party. It claimed 
that Obasanjo was part of the problem.
The FNDIC was responsible for the seizures of oil installations in the Ijaw 
areas of Delta State such as Ogulagha and Forcados between 1997 and 1998. 
The seizures were to compel government relocation of the Warri South West 
local government headquarters in the conflict with Itsekiri in Warri (Okafor, 
1998; Amaize, 1998). Since March 2003, the FNDIC has in the course of hos-
tilities against the Itsekiris and the federal government, stopped oil production 
by Shell, Chevron-Texaco and Elf in the Warri region. Nearly 40% of Nigeria’s 
crude oil production of 2.2 m bpd halted with a total loss of over 800,000 bpd 
in the first week. Unfortunately, because the FNDIC actions coincided with the 
Allied Forces war with Iraq and low gasoline stocks in the United States, there 
was an increase in crude oil prices and increased volatility of the oil market 
(Lawal, 2003).
The Niger Delta Resistance Movement is another militant group among the 
Ijaws. In 2000, the movement threatened to close down flow stations and pro-
duction facilities in the Niger Delta following delays in the passage of the 
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) bill (Amazige, 2000). The Niger 
Delta Oil Producing Communities Development Organization has also been 
involved in the militancy and violent encounters in the Niger Delta. But in 
1999, the group agreed to lay down arms following the mediation of then Chief 
Obasanjo. In the current Ijaw militia hostilities with the Nigerian state and the 
Itsekiris in the Warri area, the group appealed to warring Ijaw youths to lay 
down arms and embrace dialogue (Ezereonwu, 2003). 
ETHNIC MILITIAS IN THE NIGER DELTA: THE EGBESU MILITIA
The Egbesu is a deity and belief system, a unifying spirit and a fortify-
ing power among the Ijaws that is claimed to guarantee initiates invincibil-
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ity during justified wars. Ordinarily the deity, its priests and its claims are part 
of the culture of the people that has been increasingly consigned to history. 
But it became relevant following the increased agitation and militancy among 
the Ijaws and other groups of the Niger Delta. As the youths became more 
involved and militant, the need for fortification and invincibility of militants 
became imperative. The Egbesu and its priests became important as youths and 
other militants flocked to them to be initiated. Because of the mass belief in 
the efficacy and invincibility of the Egbesu, many militant youths and members 
of the IYC are Egbesu initiates.
The chief priest of the Egbesu shrine is the head of the Egbesu. He is 
consulted by the Egbesu initiates in the course of militant actions. The 
Headquarters of the Egbesu is the shrine at Amabulou at Ekeremor LGA of 
Bayelsa State. The flock of initiates following the intensification of the struggle 
led to resuscitation of Egbesu shrines in other communities and the appointment 
of other chief priests. The present chief priest is Chief Augustine Ebikeme, a 
prominent chief in Bayelsa State. Another important chief priest is at Egbema 
in Delta State. The Egbesu are armed with guns and ammunitions. They are 
expected to be disciplined and bound by certain rules and regulations as to 
morality and conduct. They can be identified by the red or white bands tied on 
their heads during militant encounters.
The Egbesu is the fighting arm of most militant Ijaw groups which are coor-
dinated by and are part of the IYC. The Egbesu is not a closely knit organi-
zation because its members or initiates are actually members of various mili-
tant groups. Its roles in the struggle are not through itself as an organized and 
cohesive militia, but through its initiates in the various affiliate groups of the 
IYC. Therefore it is difficult to assign any specific actions or encounters to 
Egbesu as a militia group because most militant actions of the Ijaws in relation 
to the state, oil companies and other ethnic groups have been undertaken by the 
Egbesus in different militant organizations. 
The Egbesu initiates have been in the fore-front of armed conflicts involv-
ing the Ijaw youths. They stormed the Bayelsa Government House on 20 July 
1998 to free MOSIEND President Timi Ogoruba held by Governor Omoniyi 
Olabade. Between 31 December 1998 and early 1999, under the operation cli-
mate change of the IYC, they clashed with the Nigerian military and police in 
bloody encounters in Mbiama, Yenagoa, Kaiama and other towns in Bayelsa 
State which precipitated the declaration of state of emergency in January 1999. 
The Egbesu have fought in the Itsekiri and Ijaw conflicts in Delta (1997-1999, 
2003), the Ijaw–Ilaje conflicts in Ondo State (1998–2000), the Ijaw Youth 
Council and Oduduwa People Congress conflict in Ajegunle, a Lagos suburb, 
in 2000, and the general regime of violent confrontations with the state and the 
MNCs. 
There have been two organized groups of the Egbesu militias. The first is 
the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) and second, the Supreme Egbesu 
Assembly (SEA). The NDVF or the Egbesu Boys of Africa was an active 
Egbesu group between 1998 and 2000. It was a militant group comprised mainly 
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of Egbesu initiates. Its members, largely youths, were fully equipped with mod-
ern firearms, had some training and were said to be bold in battle because of a 
sense of invincibility (Suleiman, 1999). Its coordinator and spokesman was Bello 
Orubebe. Alex Preye was the chief priest of the Egbesu deity to which the 
NDVF members were initiates. The chief priest has died, and the group no lon-
ger exists.
The group suspended action following the appeal of the Ijaw National 
Congress and Ijaw traditional rulers on 3 January 1999, who assured that the 
Federal Government was to address the problems. Consequently, the youth 
members were directed to vacate flow stations and other oil installations. In 
1999, the NDVF warned that the organization could not guarantee the safety of 
foreign nationals operating in the Niger Delta. 
The central demands of the NDVF included the renegotiation of the place of 
the Niger Delta in the Nigerian federation through a sovereign national confer-
ence and the direct allocation of oil revenues to the communities which could 
foster the much needed development that the Oil Mineral Producing Areas 
Development Commission (OMPADEC) had failed to bring about. The NDVF 
sought a 20% equity stake by the oil producing communities in the operation 
of oil companies, and employment of Ijaw youths, on quota and on merit.
The Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA) attempted an organized political lead-
ership and administrative co-ordination of the Egbesu initiates. The members of 
the SEA are comprised of the leaders of groups of Egbesu from different com-
munities. The chairman is Sergeant Were Digifa. Initially, Timi Ogoruba, one 
of the foremost leaders of the Ijaw militant struggle and former president of 
MOSIEND was the administrative leader, and Felix Tuodolor, later IYC pres-
ident, was secretary of the SEA. The group has remained militant and is an 
affiliate group of the IYC. In 2002, its leaders accused the current Obasanjo 
administration of subverting the resource control agitation of the IYC by caus-
ing divisions (Etim, 2001: 5). 
THE RESPONSE FROM MULTI-NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES AND THE 
STATE
Central to the emergence of the youth militancy and the phenomenon of 
youth militias were the strategies and behavior of the oil companies and the 
Nigerian state.
I. MNCs STRATEGIES AND THE MILITIA PHENOMENON
The seed of militancy was sown when the oil companies disinherited the 
HCs in the acquisition of land and water resources for oil exploitation. By fed-
eral laws, the MNCs paid pitiable compensation since they did not seem to 
matter in a legal framework in which all resources were appropriated by an 
intensely hegemonic state. Initial protests and petitions were ignored and in the 
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emergent power relations, the HCs were subordinate and powerless while the 
MNCs were arrogant, insensitive and irresponsive. 
The treatment of community demands and claims relating to compensa-
tion, oil spillages and development of the HCs were so contemptuous and pro-
longed, achieving pitiable results, that the local leaderships were thoroughly de- 
legitimated. The corrupt MNCs community liaison officers created greasy corpo-
ratist relationships and networks with local elites in exchange for lower penetra-
tion costs and cordial community relations further de-legitimized the traditional 
governance structures. Local leaders were paid huge sums and awarded con-
tracts to pacify their communities. Further they were not sanctioned when they 
appropriated MNCs payments. In several communities, traditional rulers and 
community elders have become corrupt (Kemedi, 2003: 18-21). 
When the exasperated communities began to protest against the MNCs treat-
ment, the MNCs invited state security agents to repress, intimidate and harass 
them. The humiliation and failures further undermined traditional governance 
systems in the HCs. Kemedi (2003: 15) noted that the oil industry is strongly 
“linked to the breakdown of the traditional structures in the (oil) communities.” 
In some cases, they were compelled to hand over the responsibility for liaising 
and negotiating with the oil companies to youths and community development 
associations (Kemedi, 2003: 13).
As the traditional leadership structures were being de-legitimated, the youth 
leaders emerged as the new saviors. Alagoa (2000) noted that unemployed 
youths, in some cases have simply pushed aside, sometimes with intimidation 
or violence, their elders and traditional authorities seen as “ineffective against 
the external and internal agents that exploit the people.”
The MNCs tended to relate to leadership tussles, factionalization and intra-
community conflicts in terms of which faction was more powerful and poten-
tially disruptive as opposed to which groups or factions were properly consti-
tuted and traditionally legitimate. The perception favored youth groups. 
Kemedi (2003: 13-21) detailed in Nembe and Peremabiri in Bayelsa State, 
numerous incidences of challenges to traditional authorities and the emergence 
of youth leaderships. In each case, the Shell Petroleum Development Company 
(SPDC) accorded recognition, partnered and related with the youths, simply 
because the youth had more disruptive power on oil production. Therefore the 
youths emerged as community leaders. These youths became the power brokers, 
the liaison with the MNCs, and the object of MNCs patronage (Kemedi, 2003: 
13-21). 
The realization that violent protests and disruptive actions orchestrated imme-
diate attention and benefits from the MNCs fueled communal and violent youth 
protests. By the 1990s, most of the protests and production disruptions were 
undertaken by youths and youth militants. Some youths began to hijack ships 
and helicopters, kidnap MNCs staff, and vandalize facilities in order to obtain 
pay-offs ransoms and payments from the oil companies. 
Exasperated by this, the MNCs began to engage the youths proactively. They 
began a system where the youth leaders were identified and paid regularly to “sit 
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at home but don’t disturb or disrupt our operation” with surveillance contracts 
to protect MNCs facilities. But the expectations, opportunities and the exagger-
ated living standards created through these payments have been difficult to sus-
tain. Instead, the provisions funded the proliferation of arms and ammunitions 
in the region.
II. STATE REPRESSION 
Militant actions against the oil economy have always been accompanied with 
state repression. The mobile police and the military have been deployed against 
protesting communities with terrible fatalities at Umuechem in 1990, Ikebiri I 
and II in 1999, Choba in 1999 and Odi in 1999 (Osi, 1990; Ekeinde, 1999; 
Onuorah, 1999; Onwumeodo, 1999). When MOSOP began mass protests against 
Shell in Ogoniland, the federal government sent in a security force to maintain 
continued oil exploitation. The force became an army of occupation for sev-
eral years that looted, maimed, raped, killed, and harassed the Ogoni people 
(Saro-Wiwa, 1997; Oyerinde, 1998).
Since 1997 the state has gone beyond the security veils of military and 
police protection for the MNCs, to massive deployments in the oil produc-
ing communities to crush even the most peaceful opposition (The Africa Fund, 
1999). The federal government cracked down on Delta and Bayelsa States 
between December 1998 and January 1999. The recent Ijaw and Itsekiri militia 
confrontations and the disruptions of oil production in the Warri area of Delta 
State since March 2003, have been met with massive and continuous deploy-
ments of troops from the army and navy. At different points, armored person-
nel carriers have patrolled the region, particularly in Bayelsa State, and military 
check points have been installed in Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa States since 1997. 
The Navy has patrolled the waterways and creeks since 1999 (Obari, 1999).
The deployment of state security against protesters and militants has trans-
formed the scale of the conflict. Following the Kaiama Declaration of 1998 and 
military occupation in Bayelsa, the Egbesu militias counter-attacked and resisted 
the military and police in bloody battles in Kaiama, Yenagoa, Ekeki Yenagoa, 
Oloibiri, Opia, Ikenya, Ogbia, and on the East West Express Road, where casu-
alties and arrests counted in hundreds while about 80 soldiers were declared 
missing. In the encounters, the Army deployed armored personnel carriers, 
tanks and artillery pieces while the Navy deployed warships and fast amphibi-
ous crafts (Ikwunze et al., 1999; Niger Delta, 1999; Suleiman, 1999; Igbokwe, 
1999). Furthermore the state security agencies have generated a human rights 
crisis with extra judicial executions, torture, harassment, arbitrary detentions, 
physical assault, extortion and rape (Human Rights Watch, 1999).
Military deployments and bloody encounters have persisted. The federal gov-
ernment commenced Operation Hakuri II in 1999 to protect properties and the 
oil and energy installations in the region (Onuorah, 1999). In 2003, the Federal 
Government set up a military task force under Brigadier General Elias Zamani, 
codenamed Operation Restore Hope. Since then, the task force’s area of opera-
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tion has been extended to almost the entire Niger Delta region, and it’s com-
mand encompasses the entire army formation, naval fleet and air force bases in 
the region (James, 2003). The government continues to see the youth militancy 
as a rebellion that has to be crushed (Obari, 1999).
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MILITANCY AND MILITIA-IZATION ON THE NI-
GER DELTA CONFLICT
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGER DELTA REGION
The Nigerian state has had to make concessions. First is the increase of 
the revenue allocation to the region. This was accomplished in 1998 and 1999 
when the 1999 Constitution provided for an increased allocation on the basis of 
the derivation principle from 3% to a minimum of 13%. Second is the estab-
lishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission with funding from the 
state and MNCs. 
The Federal Ministry of Environment has become more active concerning the 
environmental practices of the MNCs. The federal government and even the 
international civil society and community have become more aware of and con-
cerned about the Niger Delta conflict and its developmental, environmental and 
human rights dimensions, because the militia groups have placed firmly on the 
national agenda the issues of state reforms, true federalism, autonomy, resource 
control and conference of ethnic nationalities.
The MNCs have also been compelled to become more socially responsible, 
particularly in the form of reaching and implementing memoranda of under-
standing and a greater commitment to the development of the oil producing 
communities. Rather than hide behind the shield of state security, the MNCs 
are engaging the communities directly and seeking the fostering of more under-
standing and co-operation with the HCs. 
II. OIL PRODUCTION AND REVENUES
Militia-ization and militancy has made more difficult and hazardous the con-
duct and operations of oil companies and oil exploitation. Sensitive equipments 
have had to be withdrawn at various times causing periodic stoppages of oper-
ations and productions. Particularly, the large-scale, organized pan-community, 
and ethnic direct actions of the youth militants have placed at risk the entire oil 
industry. Once between 1998 and 1999, youths laid siege on and took control 
of considerable portions of the offshore and onshore oil installations and opera-
tions, particularly in Bayela and Delta states (Olufemi & Aganihu, 1999).
In the last quarter of 1999, oil production at the south east (Bonny Terminal) 
and the southwest (Forcados Terminal) was cut by more than a sixth. Nigeria 
fell short of its daily production of 1.98 bpd for 3 months in 1998. Production 
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by Shell and Agip between September to October 1998 were down by 420,000 
bpd and 300,000 bpd respectively, in Bayelsa State alone (Suleiman, 1999). By 
August 1999, about US$ 1 billion had been lost by the MNCs to disruptions.
In March 2003, about 40% of oil production was shut down. The 
Forcados crude production in the Warri area fell from 650,000 bpd to 400,000 
bpd (Oduniyi, 2003). About 10 flow stations were either shut or maintained 
skeletal services by July 2003. Of these, the Dibi oil fields (Chevron/Texaco), 
Olero creek flow station (Chevron/Texaco) and the Totalfinaelf flow station at 
Opimamu in the Warri area were considerably destroyed (Abugu, 2003). On 29 
June 2003, three expatriate workers, a German and two Philippinoes were kid-
napped in Delta State by a group of Ijaw youths who demanded 25.4m naira 
for their release. Their release was secured after 14 days by the Delta State 
Governor (Okpawo, 2003). The attacks on the pipelines delivering gas to Egbim 
and Delta IV power stations in May 2003 cut the power generation of the 
National Electric Power Authority by 45% for two months. The vandalization of 
crude oil supply pipelines to the Kaduna and Warri refineries also led to their 
shut downs (Oduniyi, 2003).
In 1998, the federal government attributed the shortfall in revenue and bud-
getary failure to disruptions of oil production (Ezomon, 1999). The toll on the 
economic life of the nation of youth militancy and consequent obstructions of 
oil production was such that in 1999, the federal government considered the sit-
uation similar to a state of war. As a consequence of the threat to oil installa-
tions, the naval and military presence, and actions in the region have been the 
largest and most frequent in Nigeria since the civil war (1967-1970). 
III. CONSOLIDATION OF THE MILITIA PHENOMENON
The military occupation and repression has been resisted by youths and other 
groups, such as the Niger Delta Women for Justice (NDWJ), the Ijaw Elders 
Forum, Ijaw National Congress, Bayelsa Indigenes Association and the civil 
rights movement such as the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights 
(CDHR). The NDWJ organized a protest march against militarization in Port 
Harcourt in 1999 (Obibi, 1999; Niger Delta, 1999). The youths have particularly 
seen the military occupation as provocative and oppressive. The attacks and 
harassment by the security agencies in December 1998 led to reprisal attacks 
and bloody encounters. Since 1999, the main demand of the IYC and its affili-
ate groups has been the immediate withdrawal from Ijaw land of all military 
forces of occupation and repression (The Kaiama Declaration, 1998).
The persisting military repression has consolidated the phenomena in two 
ways. First, the militias have become more armed, even with more sophisticated 
arms. Second, the encounters have become more large-scale, long-term, and 
intensive as the battles in the Warri region of Delta State since March 2003 
indicate. Third, the militias have become even more vicious in their actions 
against the oil companies and other ethnic groups and communities. 
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IV. INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY
The militancy and militia-ization and the violent state responses have resulted 
in a vicious cycle of uncertainty, tensions, insecurity, and instability. It has cre-
ated the most serious threat to Nigeria’s security and survival since the civil 
war. Nigeria’s economic and political stability has several times been threatened 
between 1993 and 2003. 
Numerous settlements and communities have been sacked or destroyed in 
the confrontations. In the Itsekiri/Ijaw conflicts in Warri region in 1997 and 
2003, numerous settlements were burnt or destroyed by militant youths. In the 
2003 conflict, the Ijaw communities of Obumkiran, Kumtie, Seitorububor and 
Okerenkoko in Warri South West LGA were allegedly destroyed in the confron-
tations between the Nigerian military and the Ijaw youths (Fiakpa, 2003).
More recently, factionalization, leadership crises and conflicts among the 
youth groups have resulted in violent and bloody fighting. There are conflicts 
within the militia groups, between factions and between militia groups in vari-
ous communities, as well as conflicts with political and community leaders. 
The militias have introduced or at least heightened crime and violence in the 
politics of the Niger Delta region. Crime, thuggery, violent conflicts, and violent 
electoral and political competition have become common place. The militia phe-
nomenon and the general state of militancy and protests have made available 
enormous quantity of sophisticated arms and ammunitions. All kinds of armed 
groups exist. With little social control, the balkanization of the groups and pro-
liferation of arms, the situation of crime, violence, and disorder is persisting. 
Inter- and intra- group and community relations have become more violent.
V. ETHNIC IDENTITY BUILDING AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION
The resource and environmental politics has led to the resurgence or build 
up of identity and solidarity among all the ethnic groups in the region. The 
resource conflict and the struggles underlying it represented a common prob-
lem, interest and threat to the minority ethnic groups in the region. Among 
the Ijaws for example, a notion of an ethnic nation threatened by an unjust 
Nigerian state, underlined by majority ethnic hegemony and the activities of 
the oil companies was constructed. The Ijaw National Congress became a more 
important, visible and a solid rallying point for the Ijaw nation. The youths 
particularly constructed a mentality of an oppressed, neglected, threatened and 
marginalized Ijaw ethnic nationality as well as an aggrieved group that must 
fight for redress and survival. It was in this sense of siege that the Ijaw nation 
became more assertive and confrontational in relation to the state, MNCs and 
its neighbors such as the Itsekiri and Urhobos.
Thus for the Ijaws, the Niger Delta conflict raised identity, ethnic unification 
and solidarity, ethnic mobilization and identity politics. A highly mobilized Ijaw 
nation has become the platform for a broad agitation in the economy of oil. 
The Ijaws have since become the most active and violent group in the agita-
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tion in relation to ethnic rights and the contestation of state and MNCs policies 
as they relate to the region. Finally, it is the locus of proliferated militia groups 
and militia activities. 
There have been considerable tensions and conflicts between the Ijaws and 
Urhobos, the Ijaws and Itsekiris and the Ijaws and Ilajes. The Ijaw and Itsekiri 
militia feud, between 1997 and 1999 and since 2003, has been a very bloody 
and disruptive war which has led to loss of many lives, massive destruction of 
villages and of properties, disruptions of oil facilities and production and gen-
eral insecurity in the Warri region. 
CONCLUSION 
An explanation for the transformation of the Niger Delta struggle for resource 
benefits from oil exploitation into a youth-spearheaded militancy, militia-ization 
and violent contentions has been constructed in the preceding pages.
With regards to my first proposition posited in the methodology section, I 
state that indeed the nature of the state and MNCs responses to youth activ-
ism conduced the emergence of youth militancy and the militias. As to the sec-
ond proposition, indeed the youth militants have lost focus. But more impor-
tant is the loss of social control embedded in the absence of strong leader-
ship and organizational frameworks which has led to increased factionalization 
and conflicts. The loss of focus and control underpin the militia involvement in 
the pervading conflicts, violence, crime and insecurity in the region. As to the 
third proposition, there was indeed enormous support by the traditional rulership 
structures, associational fabric and the social groupings in the region. But that 
support is declining because of the loss of control and focus, involvement in 
conflicts and violence, and the increasingly excessive methods of youth engage-
ment with the state and MNCs.
The consequences of the youth militancy and the militias on the region have 
become so gravely negative that the usual justification for their existence which 
was speedy and substantive results is losing ground. While some achievements 
can be arguably attributed to the youth militants and militias, the generalized 
crime, violence, insecurity, and conflicts in the region now far outweigh such 
achievements. 
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